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1. Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates the impact of liquidity on stock returns during liquidity crises. 
An event study approach is employed to analyse the behaviour of stock returns around periods of 
crisis. The focus is set on the different effect of liquidity shocks on large and small/medium caps. 
Tests for the presence of abnormal returns show that small/medium stocks are negatively affected 
by crashes in market liquidity, while blue chips performance is not significantly influenced by the 
crises. The abnormal returns for small caps occur immediately after the liquidity crises and the 
impact generally lasts for the 15 following trading days. From a buy-and-hold perspective the 
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2.Introduction & Literature Review 
This research provides an empirical analysis of stock returns during times of crisis in aggregate 
liquidity; the main objective is to assess the impact of the shocks on securities prices and to test if 
this impact is captured by asset pricing models. For this purpose, the major liquidity crises are 
investigated in an event study framework.  
  The event study approach is commonly employed in the study of corporate events such as 
mergers or earnings announcements. This methodology allows to analyse whether a particular set 
of events is consistently able to influence stocks returns, and to make them deviate from their 
normal/expected performance. Therefore, the event study approach represents a useful tool in 
identifying the consequences of liquidity crises.  
  Liquidity is commonly defined in the financial literature as the ease by which an asset can be 
bought or sold in the market without incurring in significant losses originating from a price 
difference or from transactions costs.  
  The direct and indirect costs of illiquidity need always to be taken into account when making 
investing decisions due to their ability to significantly impact the performance of an investment 
strategy. Furthermore, this liquidity-related risk is likely to increase during episodes of crisis.  
For that reason, liquidity and its impact on asset prices have been widely investigated in recent 
years. 
  A number of measures for liquidity have been developed and the general consensus among 
researchers suggests that there exists a certain degree of correlation between stocks returns and 
market liquidity, and that this correlation is indeed priced in the market.  
Amihud & Mendelson (1986) adopted the bid-ask spread as measure of liquidity, this figure 
represents the difference between the price at which an investor is able to buy and to sell a 
specific security in the open market.  
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   Their findings show that average returns are an increasing function of illiquidity. The economic 
rationale is that if a security is more sensitive to shocks in liquidity, investor will be less prone to 
buy it, and hence they will require higher expected returns.  
  Pastor & Stambaugh (2003) analyse market-wide liquidity and test its significance as a state 
variable in asset pricing models. Employing a measure of liquidity that reflects price impact of 
order flows, they find that stock liquidity betas (measured as stocks’ sensitivity to innovations in 
aggregate liquidity) play an important role in asset pricing.  
  Further support to the relevance of liquidity is provided by Y.Hamiud (2002), whose empirical 
study tests for the existence and statistical significance of illiquidity premiums. His findings are 
in line with the previous financial literature, as his empirical tests suggest that there exists a 
positive relation between illiquidity and ex-ante stock excess return. His results also show how 
small caps returns are on average more sensitive to changes in illiquidity than large cap, 
providing also an empirical explanation of the so called small firms effect, which is not entirely 
captured by common asset pricing models.  
  Other studies focus on how the sensitivity to changes in liquidity varies over time and across 
different economic states. Fujimoto & Watanabe (2004) considered two different state of the 
world, one associated with low liquidity betas and the other with high liquidity betas. Through 
this comparative analysis they show that the degree of uncertainty regarding future assets demand 
significantly influences stock returns and their sensitivities to shocks in aggregate liquidity. 
  The event-study method for the study of liquidity has already been employed by Cao & Petrasek 
(2013). Their work studies the effectiveness of market models around periods of illiquidity crises. 
Their findings reveal that the main asset pricing models are, on average, not able to provide good 
estimates of expected returns in these context. The empirical test that they performed show that 
illiquidity betas (sensitivity of stock returns to aggregate liquidity) are strongly correlated with 
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the abnormal returns observed in these situations. They also investigate information asymmetry 
as a source of liquidity risk, and their statistical analysis shows that more transparent companies 
on average outperform their peers during liquidity crises.  
  This study will follow a similar procedure, but the focus is set on the different outcomes of the 
shock according to companies’ size, measured by their market capitalization. The economic 
intuition is that shocks in aggregate liquidity should alter the market perception of illiquid stocks. 
The effect of a collapse in market-wide liquidity creates uncertainty around illiquid securities due 
to the reduced ability to liquidate those assets. This uncertainty can translate in a drop in prices 
and in the observation of abnormal returns. Liquidity risk should also have a more significant 
impact on small caps rather than on large caps, since for an illiquid stocks the risk of not being 
able to find a buyer or a seller is considerably higher than for blue chips. As shown by Y.Amihud 
(2002) small caps are, on average, more sensitive to swings in market-wide liquidity than larger 
public corporations, this should reflect also in stock returns. 
  The impact of liquidity crisis is a crucial factor which needs to be taken into consideration when 
managing portfolios of stocks. If a portfolio has a high exposure to illiquidity risk its long term 
performances might be hijacked by abnormal negative returns around liquidity shocks. Therefore, 
analysing the significance and the magnitude of the anomalous returns has important implications 
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3.Data and Methodology 
3.1 Dataset and Subsamples 
The data sample for this empirical study covers the period from 2005 to 2015 and consists of 
stocks prices with a daily frequency from the S&P500 index, as well as the index itself and the 
daily volume of trades. These observations have been retrieved from Bloomberg. Estimates for 
the SMB HML and Momentum are also employed in this thesis, these data have been retrieved 
from the Kenneth French website. The framework applied to this study is based on the 
methodology for event study suggested by MacKinlay (1997).  
  The analysis will be performed on two subsamples of stocks, representing the two extreme 
deciles of stocks ranked by companies size, which represent small caps and large cap stocks 
respectively, as suggested by Y.Amihud (2002) and by Fujimoto & Watanabe (2006).  
  In order to build the two sub-samples, we consider only the stocks for which the entire set of 
observations is available, then this sub-set of stocks are ranked by market cap as in the end of 
2015 (Appendix – Table (1)), out of 505 stocks in total, we will consider only 411, therefore the 
first subset includes the top 40 stocks by market cap and the second includes the bottom 40 
stocks.  
 
3.2 Illiquidity Measure and Event Dates 
The events that this paper aims to study are the days in which the most significant liquidity 
shocks occur. These dates are not explicitly identified like, for instance, earnings announcements 
or IPOs dates; therefore, there is the need to define a measure of illiquidity, and to study the 
dynamic of this measure in order to identify the extreme events in its fluctuation.  
  As suggested by Y.Amihud (2002) and Acharya&Pedersen (2005), the price impact or ILLIQ 
measure is employed throughout this study. The authors argue that stock illiquidity can be 
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defined as the effect that each dollar of trade has on the price of the underlying security. In this 
case this concept is applied to an equity index therefore, a good estimate of the price impact of 
the volumes of trade can be computed as the ratio of its daily return in absolute value to the 
trading volume on each trading day.  
            𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =
|𝑅𝑖,𝑡|
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡
          (1) 
  Daily log-returns are calculated for S&P500 index on a daily basis, and using daily observation 
for the volumes of trade the ILLIQ values are computed for the same timeframe and for the entire 
sample (Appendix – Graph (1)). 
  The second step is to identify the dates in which the liquidity crises happen, these dates are 
defined as the most extreme observations of aggregate illiquidity, which represent also the 
moments of lowest degree of liquidity in the market.  
  In order to find these events in the fluctuations of illiquidity, we need to generate the daily series 
for this measure. Using the computed daily observation of ILLIQ a ranking is built and the top 40 
observations have been extracted (out of 2769 observation). These 40 dates identify the days in 
which illiquidity reached its highest values (see Appendix - Table (2)).  
  When ranking the observations, a clustering effect is clearly noticeable in the dynamics of 
illiquidity, this implies that very low levels of liquidity are concentrated around certain periods of 
time. As shown in Graph (1) (see appendix) the financial crisis of 2008 and the sovereign debt 
crisis of 2011 are easily recognizable.  
  As suggested by MacKinlay (1997) the event windows or the estimation periods of an event 
should not overlap with other events object of the study, since the price changes produced by an 
event may affect the stocks expected returns for the following periods. It is crucial for the 
purpose of the event study to identify a unique event date for each crisis. Overlapping estimation 
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periods and event windows may produce biased results; therefore, the event dates are reduced to 
the five observations in which the illiquidity measure reaches its peaks.  
  The top 40 observations in the time series of ILLIQ are grouped into 5 main illiquidity clusters 
(highlighted in Graph (2)) and each cluster the highest ranked observation within the group 
defines an event date for the event study. 
 
Graph (2) – ILLIQ top 40 & Illiquidity Clusters 
 
  The event study will analyse the performance of the two subsets of stocks around the crises 
dates, displayed in Table (3).  
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3.3 The Event Study Settings and the CAAR Method 
For each event date and for each stock, the following measures are computed for the two 
subsamples of stocks:  
Abnormal Returns  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑖,𝑡−1]          (2) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(𝑇1,𝑇2) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
         (3) 





𝑖=1          (4) 
  The abnormal returns defined in Equation (2) measure the difference between the observed 
return and the expected return, AR coincides with the ex-post observed residuals for the 
considered asset pricing model (𝜀𝑖,𝑡), therefore they capture the price movements not explained 
by the underlying asset pricing model. If there exists an identifiable pattern in the series of ARs 
surrounding the event dates, the events object of the study are likely to significantly affect the 
behaviour of the stocks for which the analysis is performed.  
  In order to identify those patterns in ARs and to test their statistical significance it is useful to 
aggregate the ARs observed around the event date and for a defined period of time, the Event 
Windows. The cumulative abnormal returns defined in Equation (3) are calculated as the sum of 
the abnormal returns over the event window, and it provides an estimate of the overall direction 
and size of the stock behaviour during the crises.   
  The CAR measure aggregates the AR per each event dates, but in order to test the significance 
of the events objet of the study a further level of aggregation is needed.  
Considering 40 stocks and 5 event dates, each subsample will produce 200 CARs, these measures 
can be averaged, and their average produces the cumulative average abnormal returns or CAAR 
(as shown in Equation (4)). 
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 In order to identify the above mentioned measures, we also need to specify:  
 An asset pricing model,  
 An estimation window  
 An event window  
The asset pricing model used throughout this study is the four-factor model proposed by Carhart 
(1997) in which stocks returns are explained by the market factor, by the small minus big factor, 
by the high minus low factor, as suggested by Fama&French (1992), plus the Carhart momentum 
factor.  
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽1,𝑖 ∗ 𝑟𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑡
𝑒 + 𝛽2,𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4,𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡         (5) 
In order to perform the event study, the OLS estimates for the above model are computed for all 
the stocks taken into account. For the purpose of this empirical research, an estimation windows 
of 250 days is considered, meaning that the Carhart four-factor model for period t is estimated 
using the observations starting in t-250. This estimation window provides good estimates for the 
model coefficients and it also guarantees that the estimation periods for each event object of the 
study do not overlap with other illiquidity crises, since this may involve a biased estimation for 
the CARs, as explained by MacKinlay(1997). 
Once the expected returns for each stock are computed, the abnormal returns can be determined 
and these abnormal returns are aggregated for eight different event windows which last 
respectively 25, 20, 15, 10, 7, 5, 3 and 2 periods. 
  The Average CAR is calculated through the aggregation of the cumulative abnormal returns 
across stocks and events.  
  Using the above measures, we can test the significance of the abnormal return through a cross-
sectional t-test with the following set of hypotheses:  
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{
𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2) = 0
𝐻1: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2) ≠ 0
               (6) 
Under the null hypothesis the impact of the event on the stock returns is not statistically 
significant, since, on average, the abnormal returns around the event dates is not consistently 
different from zero.  
The test statistic is computed as follows:  
𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 =
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2)
?̂?𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2)
             (7) 









              (8) 
The cumulative abnormal returns and the CAARs are computed and tested over all the event 
windows, this allows to analyse the timing of the abnormal returns and their dynamic over time.  
 
3.4 The BHAR Method 
An alternative measure of the deviation of the stock returns from its normal performances is the 
buy and hold abnormal return (or BHAR).  
  The BHAR as proposed by Jay R. Ritter (1991) and Barber & Lyon (1997) represents the 
difference between the observed returns of an investment over a certain holding period around 
the event date, and the normal return that the same investment was expected to generate for the 
same length of time, considering the underlying asset pricing model.  
  The BHAR measure provides a clearer representation of the investor experience during the 
liquidity crisis since it captures the actual unexpected impact of the liquidity shock over a certain 
holding period.  
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𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑒(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
− ∏(1 + 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
])                 (9) 
In order to assess the statistical significance of the BHAR, it is averaged across stocks and events 







               (10) 
As suggested by Johnson (1978) the buy-and-hold abnormal return is positively skewed, 
therefore, the results of a standard t-test would be biased, for this reason Johnson developed a 
skewness adjusted t-test that takes into account the peculiarity of the BHAR’s distribution.  
The t-statistic is computed as follows: 






?̂?]            (11) 




 ; ?̂? =




  (12)  
And where 𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑𝑗 follows a t-student distribution, therefore we can employ the Johnson 
skewness-adjusted t-test to test the null hypothesis of zero average BHAR (Equation (13)). 
{
𝐻0: 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅) = 0
𝐻1: 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅) ≠ 0
                 (13) 
  As previously done for analysis of CAARs the Johnson skewness-adjusted t-test is applied to 
several holding periods which last respectively 25, 20, 15, 10, 7, 5, 3 and 2 periods.  
  Finally, after the above mentioned tests have been performed for both subsamples, the results 
are qualitatively compared to assess the different effect of illiquidity for the subsets of 
small/medium caps stocks against the subset of large caps.  
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  According to the financial literature and to the general economic consensus regarding the impact 
of illiquidity, the expectations are to observe negative abnormal returns for both subsets of stocks 
and to withstand a more significant deviation for what concerns small/medium caps if compared 
to large stocks. Moreover, the negative performance of stocks should not be anticipated by the 
markets since liquidity crises are highly unpredictable, therefore the ARs should occur starting 
from t+1. The duration of the impact should depend on the specific of the events and is not 
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4.Results  
4.1 The CAAR Approach – First Subsample 
Graph (3) shows the observed cumulative average abnormal returns for the subsample of small 
and medium stocks over the 25 period after the liquidity crises date.   
Graph (3): CAAR 1st Subsample 
 
  Table (4) presents the value for the cross-sectional t-test performed on the CAARs for the first 
subsample of stocks and considering several event windows. T-statistics and the relative p-values 
are calculated. Moreover, the number of positive and negative CAARs across stocks and event 
dates are displayed and compared. 
Considering the t-statistics and the p-values shown in Table (4) it is possible to reject the null 
hypothesis stated in Equation (6). For the considered set of events and asset pricing models the 
CAARs are consistently different from zero, therefore, the events object of the study are likely to 
meaningfully affect the returns of smaller cap stocks. Taking into account a confidence interval 
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of 1.00% the CAARs are statistically significant for event windows up to 10 periods after the 
event date, and up to 15 periods for a confidence interval of 2.5%.  
Table (4): Cross Sectional t-Tests – CAAR Method – 1st Subsample 
 
  Most of the Average ARs after 15 periods from the event dates are positive (see Table (5)), 
suggesting that the impact of the liquidity crises starts vanishing after t+15. 
In order to test whether the market anticipates the liquidity crises cross sectional t-test are 
performed also for event windows starting before the event dates, event windows for (-10,25) and 
(-20,25) were considered. As expected, due to the highly unpredictability of the liquidity crises, 
the AR generated before the event are not statistically significant as shown in Table (6) and in 
Table (7) (see appendix).  
 
4.2 The CAAR Approach – Second Subsample 
The same methodology is employed to analyse the performance of large caps around the liquidity 
crisis days. Table (5) displays the results of the cross sectional t-test and the CAAR (0,25) for the 
second subset of stocks.  
  The observed abnormal returns are initially positive, and turn negative only after 5-6 trading 
days, meaning that right after the event large caps tend to outperform expectations. Despite this 
Date CAAR Pos : Neg Negative Cross Sectional T-Test Prob
(0,25) -0.34% 97 : 103 51.50% -0.5237 0.6005
(0,20) -0.84% 90 : 110 55.00% -1.4528 0.1463
(0,15) -1.17% 94 : 106 53.00% -2.3248 0.0201
(0,10) -1.35% 87 : 113 56.50% -3.2256 0.0013
(0,7) -0.93% 85 : 115 57.50% -2.6063 0.0092
(0,5) -1.28% 82 : 118 59.00% -4.1276 0.0000
(0,3) -1.03% 75 : 125 62.50% -4.0845 0.0000
(0,2) -0.62% 83 : 117 58.50% -2.8384 0.0045
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initial trend, the observed CARs revert quickly to negative values and they stay negative for the 
following periods.  
Table (5): Cross Sectional t-Tests – CAAR Method – 2nd Subsample 
 
  Even if the dynamic of abnormal returns seems to follow a precise pattern, the observed CAARs 
are not statistically significant for any of the event windows taken into account and considering a 
wider confidence interval of 5%.  
  The results of the cross sectional t-tests suggest that the liquidity crises do not systematically   
affect the returns of large cap stocks. The observed performance of blue chip after the crises does 
not consistently deviate from the expected returns generated by the asset pricing model taken into 
account.  
  These findings differ from the initial expectations of this research, in fact, according to 
economic theory and to the previous financial literature, all stocks should suffer from drops in 
aggregate liquidity. The empirical evidence of this study suggest that large caps are not largely 




Date CAAR Pos : Neg Negative Cross Sectional T-Test Probability
(0,25) -0.0119 84 : 116 58.00% -1.7582 0.0787
(0,20) -0.0061 81 : 119 59.50% -1.5049 0.1324
(0,15) -0.0018 96 : 104 52.00% -0.5075 0.6118
(0,10) -0.0015 89 : 111 55.50% -0.5082 0.6113
(0,7) -0.0005 88 : 112 56.00% -0.2139 0.8306
(0,5) 0.0024 103 : 97 48.50% 1.1139 0.2653
(0,3) 0.0033 106 : 94 47.00% 1.8544 0.0637
(0,2) 0.0022 100 : 100 50.00% 1.4434 0.1489
17 | P a g e  
 
4.3 BHAR Method – First Subsample 
Graph (5) and Table (6) present the main results of the BHAR analysis for the first subsample of 
stocks.  
  The average BHAR measure allows to analyse the impact of liquidity crises on stocks 
performances, since it represent the actual abnormal return that an investor would face for each 
considered holding period.  
Graph (5) – Average BHAR (0,25) – 1st Subsample 
Table (6) – BHAR Skewness Adjusted T-Test – 1st Subsample 
Date BHAR Pos : Neg T-Statistic
Skewness Adjusted           
T-Statistics
Prob
(0,25) -0.0016 100 : 100 -0.2286 -0.2279 0.8197
(0,20) -0.0122 89 : 111 -1.6975 -1.7245 0.0846
(0,15) -0.012 88 : 112 -2.0148 -2.0748 0.038
(0,10) -0.0151 82 : 118 -2.988 -3.0998 0.0019
(0,7) -0.0103 86 : 114 -2.5235 -2.5422 0.011
(0,5) -0.0129 84 : 116 -3.0052 -3.1702 0.0015
(0,3) -0.0107 80 : 120 -2.7569 -3.0532 0.0023
(0,2) -0.0057 90 : 110 -2.0155 -2.1263 0.0335
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  The results for the cross-sectional t-test previously described are confirmed by the analysis of 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns. As expected, small and medium size stocks generally 
underperform expectations around liquidity crises.  
  For event windows up to 15 periods the average BHAR is consistently negative and from a 
statistical point of view, the buy and hold returns are significantly different from zero 
(considering a 5% confidence interval).   
  The cumulative performance for an investment in the considered small cap stocks would 
produce a return 0.5% lower than expected for a 2 days holding period, and the unexpected 
negative return will be on average 1.7% for a holding period of 8 days.  
  If we consider the observed distribution of abnormal returns, with a 2 days holding period, the 
unpredicted return produced by an investment in small stocks would be lower than -5% for more 
than 1 out of 10 observations (see appendix Graph (6)).  
  The risk of holding small cap stocks during liquidity crises is even more significant when 
analysing the observed BHARs for an 8 days holding period as displayed in Graph (7).  
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  Considering this event window, 20% of the observed BHAR are below -5% and 10% of the 
observations are below -10%, the downside risk is considerably high if compared to the positive 
observed buy and hold abnormal returns, where only 1 out of 200 observations generates BHAR 
higher than 10%.  
 
4.4 BHAR Method – Second Subsample 
Table (7) presents the main results of the BHAR approach for the second subsample of stocks.  
Table (7) – BHAR Skewness Adjusted T-Test – 2nd Subsample 
 
  Like previously observed for the CAAR analysis, also from a buy and hold point of view, the 
liquidity crises do not affect consistently the returns of large cap stocks. The same pattern 
identified for the cumulative abnormal return is observed for the average BHAR.  
  In the periods following the event dates large stocks tend to outperform expectations, delivering 
a buy-and-hold return 0.39% higher than expected over the same timeframe. The average BHAR 
for the holding period (0,3) is also significant from a statistical perspective (considering a 5% 
confidence interval), suggesting that the events, in the very short run, affects positively the stock 
performances.  




(0,25) -0.0026 99 : 101 -0.523 0.601
(0,20) 0.0011 96 : 104 0.2349 0.8143
(0,15) 0.0035 98 : 102 0.8228 0.4106
(0,10) 0.0023 100 : 100 0.6497 0.5159
(0,7) 0.0019 101 : 99 0.7387 0.4601
(0,5) 0.0036 99 : 101 1.5867 0.1126
(0,3) 0.0039 103 : 97 2.1737 0.0297
(0,2) 0.0023 97 : 103 1.3191 0.1871
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As previously mentioned this effect can be associated with a flight-to-liquidity phenomenon, 
meaning that if the investors expect a possible crash in the market, they would choose to seek 
positions in more liquid stocks, since this increase their ability to liquidate the exposure in the 
near future.  
  The remaining BHAR are not statistically significant, suggesting that on average liquidity crises 
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5. Conclusions 
This study provides further empirical evidence in the analysis of liquidity crises. Small and large 
caps behaviour is investigated for the period between 2005 and 2015. The results generated by 
the two subsamples shows substantial differences.  
  Small and medium stock returns seem to be highly affected by the events considered; illiquidity 
shocks tend to negatively affect small caps which are underperforming the expectations. This 
impact, on average, is not captured by common asset pricing models, and it generally arises 
immediately after the event, and lasts for the following 15 trading days.  
  The implications for investors can be significant since the downside risk of holding small caps 
increases steeply in periods of liquidity crisis, confirming the prominent role played by liquidity 
in portfolio management decisions.  
  For what concerns large caps, the impact of illiquidity is much milder, the abnormal returns are 
not statistically significant for most of the considered event windows, and the overall impact of a 
liquidity crisis is not always negative. In fact, the initial reaction of large caps produces positive 
CAARs and BHARs which quickly turn negative in the following periods. What arises from this 
analysis is that, for what concerns large caps the Carhart four factor asset pricing model is able to 
efficiently predict returns, also when market illiquidity reaches extreme levels.  
   The initial tendency to outperform expectations can be related to the investors’ preference for 
liquid asset in context of liquidity crises and of general uncertainty on the market, therefore an 
initial shift may originate from portfolios rebalancing. In order to prove this hypothesis further 
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Appendix 
Table (1) – Stocks Ranked by Market Cap: First and Tenth Deciles 
 
Top 40 Stocks Last40 Stocks
1 AAPL UW Equity 411 URBN UW Equity
2 GOOGL UW Equity 410 SWN UN Equity
3 MSFT UW Equity 409 OI UN Equity
4 BRK/B UN Equity 408 CHK UN Equity
5 XOM UN Equity 407 R UN Equity
6 AMZN UW Equity 406 PWR UN Equity
7 GE UN Equity 405 NRG UN Equity
8 JNJ UN Equity 404 DNB UN Equity
9 WFC UN Equity 403 MUR UN Equity
10 JPM UN Equity 402 FLIR UW Equity
11 PG UN Equity 401 PBI UN Equity
12 T UN Equity 400 RRC UN Equity
13 PFE UN Equity 399 LM UN Equity
14 WMT UN Equity 398 PDCO UW Equity
15 VZ UN Equity 397 RIG UN Equity
16 KO UN Equity 396 PBCT UW Equity
17 BAC UN Equity 395 OKE UN Equity
18 DIS UN Equity 394 JEC UN Equity
19 CVX UN Equity 393 FMC UN Equity
20 HD UN Equity 392 AIZ UN Equity
21 INTC UW Equity 391 NFX UN Equity
22 C UN Equity 390 FLS UN Equity
23 MRK UN Equity 389 ZION UW Equity
24 GILD UW Equity 388 TGNA UN Equity
25 PEP UN Equity 387 IRM UN Equity
26 CMCSA UW Equity 386 AVY UN Equity
27 CSCO UW Equity 385 LEG UN Equity
28 IBM UN Equity 384 HP UN Equity
29 AGN UN Equity 383 PKI UN Equity
30 AMGN UW Equity 382 PVH UN Equity
31 BMY UN Equity 381 SPLS UW Equity
32 MO UN Equity 380 NI UN Equity
33 UNH UN Equity 379 PHM UN Equity
34 MCD UN Equity 378 RHI UN Equity
35 CVS UN Equity 377 AIV UN Equity
36 MDT UN Equity 376 ALB UN Equity
37 NKE UN Equity 375 LUK UN Equity
38 BA UN Equity 374 COO UN Equity
39 CELG UW Equity 373 AES UN Equity
40 LLY UN Equity 372 AN UN Equity
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Table (5) – AARs & CARs – CAAR Method – 1st Subsample 
 






























Date CAAR Pos : Neg Cross Sectional T-Test Prob.
(-10,25) 0.0034 100 : 100 0.4584 0.6467
(-10,20) -0.003 93 : 107 -0.4313 0.6663
(-10,15) -0.0066 89 : 111 -1.0494 0.294
(-10,10) -0.0088 85 : 115 -1.5443 0.1225
(-10,7) -0.0052 87 : 113 -0.9865 0.3239
(-10,5) -0.0091 88 : 112 -1.8407 0.0657
(-10,3) -0.0074 89 : 111 -1.6023 0.1091
(-10,2) -0.0031 98 : 102 -0.6991 0.4845
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Table (7) – (-20,25) Test for Anticipated Event – Cross Sectional T-Test – 1st Subsample 
 
 









Dates CAAR Pos : Neg Cross Sectional T-Test Prob.
(-20,25) -0.0016 106 : 94 -0.1906 0.8488
(-20,20) -0.0082 95 : 105 -1.0501 0.2937
(-20,15) -0.0119 93 : 107 -1.6254 0.1041
(-20,10) -0.0141 96 : 104 -2.0723 0.0382
(-20,7) -0.0109 90 : 110 -1.6879 0.0914
(-20,5) -0.015 98 : 102 -2.4052 0.0162
(-20,3) -0.0134 93 : 107 -2.2458 0.0247
(-20,2) -0.0091 90 : 110 -1.5465 0.122
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Graph (4) – CAARs – Second Subsample 
 
Graph (6) – Scatterplot 2 Days Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
 
